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Impact of the Uruguayan





We analyze the impact of conditional cash payments on school enrollment, child 
labor and labor supply implemented between 2005 and 2007 to the poorest 
Uruguayan households. Targeting income discontinuities are not observed around 
the thresholds to participate in the program and this result invalidates the use of 
regression discontinuity designs for evaluating causal effects of the intervention. 
We apply the propensity score matching estimator to account for the endogeneity 
of program participation. We find that the program has no impact on school at-
tendance but reduces female child labor in Montevideo. In addition negative effects 
are detected on the labor market in the rest of the urban areas. 
JEL: I38, J22, H31 
Keywords: Conditional Cash Transfer Program, Targeting Method, Propensity 
Score Matching
1.   Introduction 
Since the nineties conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) have become 
one of the main tools of social protection in most Latin American and Caribbean 
countries. Despite differences in political and socioeconomic realities, CCTs are 
in the development agenda of almost all of them with similar designs. This kind 
of social policy is targeted towards families living in extreme poverty in order 
to alleviate poverty in the short term and increase investment in human capital 
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of the families in the long term. For this reason, these programs link safety nets 
directly to human capital development by making the transfer conditional on 
school attendance and regular health care. The main objective of a CCT program 
is to reduce intergenerational transmission of poverty. As the same time, it tries 
to avoid negative effects on the labor market and benefit dependence. 
In Uruguay, the CCT program—Ingreso Ciudadano—was the most important 
component of the National Emergency Plan (PANES)1, implemented between April 
2005 and December 2007. This program attempted to reduce high poverty rates 
and indigence evidenced in the socio-economic indicators released by the National 
Statistical Office (INE). Though indigence and poverty incidence grew abruptly as a 
consequence of the economic crisis of 2002, it is necessary to emphasize that it is not 
the first time that these indicators revealed high levels of poverty (see Figure 1). 
FIGURE 1
POVERTY AND INDIGENCE IN URUGUAY
(1986-2006, %)
Source: Beltrami (2002); Amarante and Vigorito (2006).
However, the more recent period is characterized by the increases in three 
measures: i) child poverty, ii) poverty severity and social exclusion (lack of access 
to information, education, health care, or political power) iii) visibility of indigence 
(De Armas, 2004). Moreover, in 2002 the indicator of income distribution (Gini 
index) reports the highest level of income concentration during the 1997-2002 period 
(Bucheli and Furtado, 2004). The increased inequality is related to changes in the 
labor market that took place in the nineties, which increased the wage gap between 
1  Ingreso Ciudadano represented the 68% of the National Emergency Plan budget.Impact of the Uruguayan Conditional Cash Transfer Program 245
high-skilled and low-skilled workers. These structural changes contributed to extreme 
poverty. Therefore, the state of “social emergency” was not only due to growth in 
poverty and indigence, but also more difficulties to mitigate them. In this context, 
the Ingreso Ciudadano program could be considered as the first step to alleviate, 
and as far as possible, eradicate situations of extreme poverty in Uruguay. 
The evaluation of this program is an essential component of the program 
agenda since it can improve policies by suggesting a more efficient use of limited 
fiscal resources. Impact evaluations experiences in Latin American and Caribbean 
countries have show that CCT programs constitute effective mechanisms to promote 
the access and use of education and health services among the poorest, as well as 
reducing poverty in the short term. But it is yet not clear whether these initiatives 
have enough capacity to reduce poverty in the medium term and to break poverty 
reproduction in the long term (Rawlings and Rubio, 2003). 
We study the impact of the Uruguayan CCT program on school attendance, 
child labor and labor supply using the annual Uruguayan national household survey, 
(ECH). We estimate the impact of the Ingreso Ciudadano program in 2006 and 2007 
separately. Despite the fact that this survey is not specifically created for the eva-
luation of the Ingreso Ciudadano program, it has the advantage over data collected 
by the ministry in charge of the program (MIDES) of being tainted by the desire of 
respondents to adopt strategic behavior in order to obtain the monetary benefit. The 
respondents, (not a public source of information), have the incentive to under report 
their income to increase the probability of being accepted into the program. 
The MIDES data are inferior for yet another reason, because it is impos-
sible to observe the results obtained by the households that have not taken part 
to the program. To get an efficient assessment of the program, we need a control 
group that can be compared with the treated group (experimental techniques). 
This could enable us to measure the real impact of the program2. In this case, 
giving the fact that treatment is not randomly assigned it is not possible to apply 
a natural experiment design to evaluate the impact of this program. Therefore, 
quasi-experimental methods like Regression Discontinuity (RD) and Propensity 
Score Matching methods (PSM) should be used. The application of the RD design 
requires that the assignment to the treatment be determined at least partly by the 
value of an observed variable to be above to a fixed threshold. It also requires 
the rigorous application of the eligibility criteria. In this program, the targeting 
method consists of an upper per capita income bound and a Critical Lack Index, 
CLI (Índice de Carencias Críticas). The household with a low per capita income 
(determined by law) and with a CLI higher than the fixed threshold established 
by the authorities could enter the program. If these criteria were fulfilled, we 
should observe a discontinuity in the probability of receiving the treatment 
surrounding the established threshold for the CLI. 
However, discontinuity is not observed surrounding the thresholds of access 
to the program. This result invalidates the estimation of the impact using RD designs 
2  This kind of experimental design was done in the CCT programs of Mexico (Parker and Teruel, 
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for evaluating causal effects of the intervention. The reasons for not reaching the 
threshold have to be the object of further research. We introduce some possible 
explanations: lack of appropriate communication between MIDES and the potential 
treatment group; lack of interest on the part of the household because of the risk of 
being stigmatized in society; administrative and operative difficulties of MIDES in 
determining the socioeconomic condition of the potential beneficiaries; etc. 
Using PSM, we find that the program has not had significant effects on 
children school attendance but has had an effect (a reduction) in female child 
labor in Montevideo. In addition, negative effects have been detected in the labor 
market, mainly on women’s labor supply in urban areas outside of Montevideo 
where more than 70% of the beneficiaries reside. To check the robustness of the 
result observed in the labor market, we estimate the impact of the program on labor 
supply using the National Household Survey of 2007. We find similar results to 
the 2006 findings. The absence of positive effects on children’s school attendance 
can be explained by the close to universal levels of primary school attendance. 
Our work is linked to the expanding literature that quantifies the impact of 
CCTs. Cardoso and Portela (2004) and Bourguignon et al. (2003) find a strong 
effect of the Brazilian Bolsa Escola program on school attendance. Cardoso and 
Portela (2004) find that Bolsa Escola has no impact on child labor. Schultz (2004), 
Behrman et al. (2000, 2001 and 2005) and Skoufias and Parker (2001) conclude 
that the Mexican program PROGRESA increased the enrolment and attendance 
rate of poor children. Additionally there is no effect on achievement test scores
Attanasio et al. (2005) find that the Colombian programme Familias en 
Acción increase the attendance of children aged 12-17 years old and has no effect 
on school attendance of children between 8 and 11 years old. Attanasio et al. 
(2006) find a reduction on child labor for the Colombian programme and Skoufias 
and Parker (2001) find a decrease in child labor in Mexico. For the Ecuadorian 
program Bono de Desarrollo Humano, Araujo and Schady (2008) find a large 
positive impact on school enrolment.
There are a few papers that analyses the labor market impact of CCT pro-
grams. González-Cossío et al. (2008) studies the Programa Apoyo Alimentario in 
rural southern Mexico and they find that the program does not have any impact on 
adult participation. However, they find a negative impact on agriculture participa-
tion and a positive effect on non agriculture participation. Skoufias and di Maro 
(2006) find that the Mexican PROGRESA period has no impact on adult labor 
force participation. Finally, Britto, Medeiros and Soares (2008) conclude for the 
Brazilian case that the programme has no negative impact on the labor market.
2.  Ingreso Ciudadano Program
The Ingreso Ciudadano program was implemented between April 2005 
and December 2007 as a monetary benefit per household, equivalent to USD 56 
in 2005 USD. The cash benefit was received monthly and payment amounts were 
updated every four months according to the Consumer Price Index (Indice de 
Precios al Consumo, IPC). The payment was conditioned on school enrolment (and Impact of the Uruguayan Conditional Cash Transfer Program 247
attendance) and regular health status control for the children of the households. 
The payment could be suspended because of not fulfilling the co-responsibilities 
without justification of the counterparts. 
The Ingreso Ciudadano program defined its target population as the first 
quantile of people below the poverty line according to the INE, 2002. The targeting 
method consists of two criteria: i) an upper per capita income limit; to receive 
the cash benefit, the household must have had a monthly per capita income lower 
than USD 51 and ii) a Critical Lack Index (CLI); households with a CLI above a 
particular value established by the authorities were selected. This index is a proxy 
means tests and it was used due to difficulties in the verification of household 
incomes given the size of the informal sector in Uruguay.
The CLI was calculated in the following way:
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where i refers to household; N is the accumulated distribution from the normal 
standard function; Xik is a vector from K variables selected on the basis of an 
estimation of a probit model where the dependant variable is a dummy that takes 
the value of one if the household belongs to the first quantile of poor households 
(according to the poverty line established by the INE methodology 2002), and 
zero if the household is poor but does not belong to the first quantile; and βk are 
the coefficients associated to each variable. The probit model was estimated for 
Montevideo and the urban areas based on the 2003 and 2004 ECH. For the rural 
areas, information from the Survey of Expenditure and Income of 1999 was used. 
The information of the group of variables Xik for the calculation of the CLI of the 
applicants was obtained from the application forms. The thresholds (cut off point) 
were defined for five different regions (Table 1).
TABLE 1
THRESHOLDS BY REGION OF THE COUNTRY
Region Limit
Montevideo  0.191
North (urban areas) 0.085
North center (urban areas) 0.055
South center (urban areas) 0.067
South (urban areas) 0.098
Source: Amarante et al. (2005)
North of the country included Artigas, Salto and Rivera; north centre of 
the country included Paysandú, Rio Negro, Tacuarembó, Durazno, Treinta y Tres 
and Cerro Largo; south centre of the country included Soriano, Florida, Flores, 248 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Noviembre) 2009
Lavalleja and Rocha; and finally south of the country included Colonia, San José, 
Canelones and Maldonado. The information to obtain the threshold levels for rural 
areas was not found and it was not in any public document. Therefore, this paper 
estimates the program impact on urban areas which nonetheless account for 93% 
of the population according to the INE.
3.  Data
To undertake this study of the impact of the CCT program in Uruguay on 
school attendance, child labor and labor supply we use the annual Uruguayan 
National Household Survey (ECH) conducted yearly by the National Statistical 
Office of Uruguay, INE. We use cross sectional data for 2006 and 2007. 
The ECH is the main source of socio-economic information about Uruguayan 
households at the national level. In the 2006 and 2007 ECH, rural areas and urban 
areas with less than 5000 inhabitants were included. The surveys were carried out 
through out the year with the objective of generating a proper description of the 
socio-economic situation of the entire population of Uruguay. 
In the 2006 ECH, several quarterly modules concentrating on different 
issues, like housing, child labor, national and international migration, technology 
and communication, were included. For this reason, and unlike the prior household’s 
surveys, the sample size was increased. The 2006 ECH has 256,866 observations 
(individuals) belonging to 85,316 households with 5.4% of the households receiving 
Ingreso Ciudadano. In the 2006 ECH there is information about child labor. The 
2007 ECH surveyed 143,185 individuals belonging to 49,136 households. In the 
2007 survey, 5.7% of the households received Ingreso Ciudadano. The Appendix 
provides simple descriptive statistics for the data used in this study. Table 2 shows 
the distribution of the households who received Ingreso Ciudadano by region.
TABLE 2







Montevideo  16,266 27 16,205 25
North (urban areas) 9,511 16 10,164 15
North center (urban areas) 12,359 21 12,610 19
South center (urban areas) 6,820 11 6,890 11
South (urban areas) 11,996 20 14,534 22
Rural areas 2,855 5 5,128 8
Total 59,808 100 65,531 100
Source: Own elaboration based on the ENHA 2006 and ECH 2007Impact of the Uruguayan Conditional Cash Transfer Program 249
Despite the fact that from 2002 the extreme poverty indicator showed 
higher values in Montevideo than in the rest of the urban country (Amarante and 
Vigorito, 2006), we observe that more than a 70% of the beneficiaries households 
were from the rest of the urban areas (see Table 2). This targeting problem could 
be a consequence of setting a targeting criterion (in this case the upper per capita 
income limit) for the whole country without considering differences in the cost 
of living between the capital city and the rest of the country. According to the 
information of INE (for December 2007), the average income of households from 
Montevideo is 46% higher than the income from the rest of the urban country 
(USD 1,064 against USD 728).
In 2006, 62% of the households that fulfilled the targeting criteria got the 
cash benefit (see Table 3). While the 38% of the households that fulfilled the tar-
geting criteria did not receive the cash benefit. In 2007, the targeting performance 
improved, reaching the 72% of the eligible households. In both years, only the 1% 




Fulfilled the targeting criteria?
2006 2007
Yes No Yes No
Received cash benefit 62 1 72 1
Not receive cash benefit 38 99 28 99
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Own elaboration based on the ECH 2006 and ECH 2007.
The targeting performance of the Ingreso Ciudadano program is similar to 
the results showed in conditional cash transfer policies implemented in the region 
(Rawlings, 2005 and CEPAL, 2006). However, is difficult to compare results because 
many of these programs were focused on population located in areas with difficult 
access due to geography accidents and different cultures and languages (Attanasio 
et al., 2005 and 2006). We do not expect to observe these difficulties in a small 
country like Uruguay especially given that we are considering only urban areas.
4.  Methodology
In this section we discuss the methodology employed to evaluate the impact 
of the Ingreso Ciudadano program. The standard for assessing causality from 
program participation to outcome variables is to use a randomized experiment. In 250 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Noviembre) 2009
a randomized experiment individuals are chosen at random from the population. 
We refer to this group as the experimental or treatment group. Since these subjects 
have been selected at random, they must be, on average, identical in characteristics 
to the “non-picked” or “control” group. The experimental group is then “treated” 
with the program. Next we compare the experimental group to the control group 
after the treatment is applied to the experimental group and any differences in 
outcomes observed in the two can be attributed to the treatment since the two 
groups were identical before treatment. In this manner we avoid the selection bias 
problem, permitting us to assess causality from treatment to outcome. 
With respect to Ingreso Ciudadano program, assignment to the treatment 
group was not random. The selection into the program depended on the value of 
an observed continuous variable (CLI) relative to a given threshold. This kind 
of treatment assignment has us consider use of a quasi-experimental design, re-
gression discontinuity (RD), in order to assess the impact of the program. There 
are two types of RD designs: sharp design, in which the treatment assignment is 
a deterministic function of only one selection variable and so the probability of 
receiving the treatment jumps from zero to one at the threshold; and fuzzy design, 
in which the treatment assignment depends stochastically on the selection variable 
and it also depend on other unobserved variables, so the probability of receiving 
the treatment does not jump from zero to one at the threshold. The fuzzy design 
holds when there are others assignment rules, which are only observed by the 
treatment administrator. Figure 2 shows the probability of receive the treatment 
given the selection variable. The figure suggests the absence of discontinuity near 
the threshold (standardized at zero)3.
In addition, the RD design needs the following identifying assumption: 
the discontinuity in the treatment variable occurs at the cut-off point of the CLI. 
Following the procedure suggested by Nichols (2007), we estimate a local linear 
regression at each side of the cut-off point. Then we compute the difference only 
using the predictions at 0 (the threshold), and finally, we bootstrap the difference so 
as to make inference. The test shows that this assumption does not hold (Table 4). 
Consequently, the application of a RD design is not plausible for the evaluation 
of the Ingreso Ciudadano program.
As a substitute, we carry out a matching technique—we find a “control 
group” that matches the “experimental group”—the set of households that parti-
cipate in the program. That is, we simulate a randomized experiment by finding a 
control group among those households who are not participant households (but who 
fulfilled the requirements to be in the program). We work backwards in comparison 
to a randomized experiment. We are presented with a treated group. This method 
involves finding a control group that matches the treated group. We use this “ma-
tched control” group to derive comparisons with the “treated” group. In this way 
we can discern causality from program participation to outcomes variables and 
thereby make inferences about the impact of the Ingreso Ciudadano program.
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In this paper we use propensity score matching (PSM) to obtain an ar-
tificially generated control group that is similar to the treatment group in every 
aspect except that a person in the control group does not receive the cash transfer 
(Heckman et al.,1997). The identification condition is that for some explica-
tive variables X the group of control has to be similar to the group of treatment:   
E[Y0 |X,I=1] = E[Y0 |X, I=0]= E[Y0 | X]
FIGURE 2
PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING THE TREATMENT GIVEN  
THE STANDARDIZED SELECTION INDEX
Source: Computed by the authors using the 2007 ECH.
Note: Using the ECH 2006, we observe the same description of the data.
TABLE 4






2006 0.09 0.07 0.18 -0.04 0.22
2007 -0.08 0.09 0.39 -0.25 0.10
Source: Own estimations based on the 2006 and 2007 ECH.
Note: Standard error in parenthesis. Bootstrap standard error based on 1000 replications for the After 
Matching test, * statistically different from zero at the 1% level.252 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Noviembre) 2009
Where Y is the outcome variable (school attendance, child labor, labor 
supply), X represents control variables (or characteristics), I take vale of one if 
the households receives transfers and cero if they does not receive it.
Rosenbaun and Rubin (1983) show that it is not necessary to perform the 
matching with respect to the vector of household characteristics X. It is enough 
to match the propensity score, that is, the predicted probability of treatment re-
ceipt (in our case program participation) given a vector of covariates. Therefore, 
so as to obtain the artificially created control group one needs to first obtain the 
propensity score for each observation that “orders” observations along a set of 
observable variables. For each treated observation we find the non-treated obser-
vation applying a Kernel matching giving the highest weight to individuals with 
propensity score closes to the score of the treated group (belonging to the region 
of common support).
That is, we obtain predicted probabilities p(X) from a probit that predicts 
program participation and then use these predicted probabilities to Kernel match 
non-participant households to participant households. PSM method normally as-
sumes that there exists a region of “common support”, where propensity score of 
treated and non-treated overlap and therefore a robust comparison can be done 
(see Fig. 3).
FIGURE 3 
REGION OF COMMON SUPPORT
2006 2007
Source: Authors’ estimations based on the 2006 and 2007 ECH.
In a second step, we match households with replacement based in p(X) 
where a household receives the treatment and the other does not. In this way we 
calculate to estimate the counterfactual of no treatment. We do the matching of 
households in p(X) and not in X directly because the estimating matching is dif-
ficult to implement when the dimension of X is high. Impact of the Uruguayan Conditional Cash Transfer Program 253
So the PSM estimator has the following structure:
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and W(i,j) is a Kernel function
The most important limitation of the PSM estimator is that the identification 
condition does not allow selection on unobservable. This methodology, enable 
us to eliminate the selection bias based on “observables”, and thus reducing the 
“aggregate bias”, only if the selection bias based on “unobservable factor” goes in 
the same direction than the former. Otherwise, the “aggregate bias” will probably 
rise. Despite the latter case does not usually appear in the empirical evidence, it 
is better to know at which level the assignment depend on “unobservable”. When 
the treatment assignment rule is of public knowledge, we might expect that some 
households adjust their behaviour in order to get treated, and so the treatment 
could depend on unobservable factors. This behaviour is what McCrary (2008) 
defined as “manipulation of the running variable” (selection variable). He proposed 
a discontinuity test to detect manipulation. We undertook the test in each region, 
selecting the household with a per capita income lower than the upper per capita 
income limit. For 2006, the test suggests that there was no manipulation (see 
Appendix, table A.1). The same results hold in the 2007 data. This is an expected 
result since it was difficult that the households control the selection variable.
The PSM is an appropriate methodology if we can control with a rich group 
of variables. The extensive samples in the 2006 and 2007 Uruguayan household 
surveys allow us to have a large number of control variables and observations, 
which reduces the cost between changes and accuracy in the second stage of 
implementation of the PSM estimator. 
In this way, the average treatment effect measures the impact of treatment 
(taking part in the Ingreso Ciudadano program), in the group of homes that receive the 
benefit. The algorithm used to make the matching between the potential controls and 
the treated is PSMATCH2, version 3.0, developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003).
Of particular concern in any study using non-experimental data is whether 
indeed the control group serves as a good comparison for the treated group. Can 
we “after the fact” demonstrate that the control group resembles the treated group 
in the pre-treatment time period? How accurate is our matching? Do the matched 
controls really serve as counterfactuals to the treated group? To gain some insights 
into the comparability of the treated with the matched controls we will report on 
a series of descriptive statistics for three groups: i) the treated group – households 
receiving Ingreso Ciudadano – ii) the untreated group – households non receiving 
Ingreso Ciudadano – ; iii) the matched controls – a subset of the untreated – those 254 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Noviembre) 2009
with propensity scores closed to the scores of the treated group, belonging to the 
region of common support.
5.  The Ingreso Ciudadano Program Impact
In this section, we quantify the impact of the program on school attend-
ance, child labour and labour supply. We perform the evaluation considering two 
geographical areas: Montevideo and the rest of the urban country.
5.1  School Attendance
The CCTs programs use the cash benefit in order to enhance the human 
capital accumulation, and so positive results on school attendance are expected. For 
the assessment of the impact on school attendance, we generate a binary variable 
that takes the value of one if the child attends school or takes the value of zero if the 
child does not in 2006. In addition, we consider two cohorts defined by age, [8,11] 
and [12,14], because of the drop-out rate, which increase sharply since the age of 
12 (the beginning of the high school). The attendance rate for children between 
6 and 11 is nearly 100% (Katzman and Rodríguez, 2006), owing to the fact that 
education is compulsory at this level. In the Appendix (Table B.1), we include the 
descriptive statistics of the sample selected for the evaluation of this variable.
In the case of teenagers between 12 and 17 years old, the attendance rate 
decrease to 85.1% for the whole country. If we only consider urban areas and 
Montevideo the drop-out rate is 12.9%. In urban areas, the attendance rate of males 
is lower than females’ attendance rate. When Katzman and Rodríguez (2006) 
analyze the attendance rate statistics for the poor population, they found that it 
decreases slightly, 75.7 and 80.6, for males and females respectively. 
The results for the children between 8 and 11 years old, show that the 
Ingreso Ciudadano program had no significant effects on school attendance (see 
Table 5). We have to emphasize that the attendance rate for children between 8 and 
11 are already high as we observe in the results. Therefore, it was not surprising 
to find no effect.
If we expect the program to enhance school attendance it is more likely to 
observe an impact in the youngest in high school. Table 6 shows no significant 
impact on the attendance rate for individuals between 12 and 14 years old. 
We have to ask ourselves about the reliability of the matching. Do the 
matched controls really serve as counterfactuals to the treated group? In Table 7 
we compare i) the treated group – Ingreso Ciudadano receiving households, ii) 
the untreated group – non-Ingreso Ciudadano receiving households and iii) the 
matched controls – a subset of the untreated- those with propensity score closest to 
the scores of the treated group, belonging to the region of common support. Results 
indicate that the matched male group is in fact indistinguishable from the treated 
group in all of the listed observable dimensions. None of the differences in means 
and proportions for the matched and treated group are statistically different from 
zero. The two groups seem identical. We only included the critical lack index and Impact of the Uruguayan Conditional Cash Transfer Program 255
TABLE 5
AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT
(School attendance [8,11] cohort, 2006)












Montevideo  Male 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00
N = 350 N = 184 (0.01) N = 184 (0.01)
Female 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00
N = 336 N = 223 (0.01) N = 223 (0.01)
Rest of the
urban country
Male 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00
N = 678 N = 333 (0.01) N = 333 (0.01)
Female 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
N = 655 N = 285 (0.00) N = 285 (0.00)
Source: Own estimations based on the ECH 2006.
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. Bootstrap standard error based on 1000 replications for the 
After Matching test, *,** statistically different from zero at 5% and 1% respectively.
TABLE 6
AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT














Montevideo  Male 0.86 0.83 0.03 0.86 0.00
N = 231 N = 151 (0.04) N = 151 (0.05)
Female 0.92 0.90 0.02 0.94 -0.02
N = 235 N = 121 (0.03) N = 121 (0.04)
Rest of the
urban country
Male 0.89 0.84 0.05 * 0.82 0.07
N = 451 N = 206 (0.03) N = 206 (0.04)
Female 0.92 0.91 0.01 0.90 0.02
N = 428 N = 209 (0.02) N = 209 (0.03)
Source: Own estimations based on the ECH 2006.
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. Bootstrap standard error based on 1000 replications for the 
After Matching test, *,** statistically different from zero at 5% and 1% respectively.
social security transfers in the matching test because these variables are defined as 
function of the socioeconomic and housing characteristics of the households. 
As discussed in the introduction when the primary school attendance is 
close to universal (as in Uruguay) the literature does not find impacts on school 
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5.2  Child Labor
Although the reduction of child labor was not an explicit objective of the 
Ingreso Ciudadano program we evaluate the impact because the program could 
affect it. Children’s time can be divided into schooling, child labour and leisure. CCT 
programs are intended to change the time allocation of the child between work and 
education, not leisure. The desired result is that increases in attendance rates reduce 
the proportion of working children. Given that we did not find a positive effect on 
the attendance rate, we also might expect no positive effects on child labour. 
To assess the impact of the plan on child labour, we use the Child Labor 
module of the ECH 2006. In this module, there are a number of questions that 
enable us to identify child between 5 and 17 who are involved in economic acti-
vities. In this research, we define child labour as children between 6 and 15 years 
old4 who carry out paid or no paid activities outside the household and also who 
spend more than 3 hours working for the household. We refer to those activities 
that can affect the normal development of the child like bricklaying, street sale, 
farm work, housekeeping, etc. We chose this age interval in order to consider the 
entrance age of school (6 years old) and to take into account the minimum age 
to work recognized by the Childhood and Adolescence code (15 years old). For 
Montevideo the proportion of child labour is 4.5% and for the rest of the urban 
country it is 5.4%, and it is positively correlated with the age.
The outcome variable is a binary variable that takes the value of one when the 
child/adolescent has positive work hours outside the household and more than 3 hours 
working for the household, and takes the value of zero otherwise. Table 8 shows only 
a reduction of the proportion of working female children living in Montevideo. 
TABLE 8
AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT














Montevideo Male 0.21 0.18 0.03 0.22 -0.03
N = 183 N = 133 (0.05) N = 133 (0.06)
Female 0.14 0.24 -0.10 ** 0.28 -0.14 **
N = 195 N = 143 (0.04) N = 143 (0.05)
Rest of the urban 
country
Male 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.13 0.00
N = 434 N = 173 (0.03) N = 173 (0.04)
Female 0.15 0.16 -0.01 0.15 0.00
N = 398 N = 167 (0.03) N = 167 (0.04)
Source: Own estimations based on the ECH 2006.
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. Bootstrap standard error based on 1000 replications for the After 
Matching test, *,** statistically different from zero at 5% and 1% respectively.
4  See the Table B.3 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics of the sample selected.258 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Noviembre) 2009
The Table 9 presents the matching test for the impact of the program on 
child labor. As in the schooling attendance case the matched control is similar to 
the treated group.
TABLE 9
MATCHING TEST FOR THE IMPACT ON CHILD LABOR
(6 to 14 years old, 2006)













Montevideo Male CLI 0.53 0.48 0.05 * 0.51 0.00
Social security 
transfers
0.85 0.66 0.19 *** 0.81 0.03
Female CLI 0.49 0.48 0.01 0.49 -0.01
Social security 
transfers
0.84 0.69 0.15 *** 0.85 0.00
Rest of the
urban country
Male CLI 0.23 0.19 0.04 *** 0.22 0.00
Social security 
transfers
0.90 0.80 0.10 *** 0.92 -0.02
Female CLI 0.24 0.19 0.05 *** 0.23 0.01
Social security 
transfers
0.90 0.82 0.08 *** 0.90 0.00
Source: Own estimations based on the ECH 2006.
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. Bootstrap standard error based on 1000 replications for the After 
Matching test, *,** statistically different from zero at 5% and 1% respectively.
As presented in the introduction the literature, we find zero or negative 
impact on child labor. In the Uruguayan case we find a negative effect only for 
girls in the capital, Montevideo. 
5.3  Labour Market
One of the main concerns of CCT programs is their potential to provide 
disincentive to work. For example, the cash transfer shifts the budget constraint 
of the household, and this enables it to substitute leisure for labor and continue 
consuming the same basket of goods5. Therefore, the benefit potentially gives 
an incentive to reduce recipients work hours, or to even opt out of the labour 
market. In addition, people who are interested in being treated could adjust their 
behaviour in order to fulfil the requirement to be in the program. For example, 
employees could arrange with employers to work “off the books” which enables 
5  That is the case when the substitute effect is stronger than the income effect.Impact of the Uruguayan Conditional Cash Transfer Program 259
the employee to under report their income and increase the likelihood of been 
selected into the program. So, CCT could also lead to an increase in the number 
of people working in the informal labour market (defined as the sector of the 
economy that does not comply with labour market legislation and compliance 
with social security taxes).
We construct three variables to quantify the effect of the program on the 
labour market: 1) Worked Hours, which is the number of worked hours per week; 
2) Rate of Participation, which is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the 
person is economically active (employed and unemployed workers) and takes the 
value zero otherwise; 3) Informal Worker, which is also a dummy variable that 
takes the value one if the worker has not complied with social security laws and 
takes zero value otherwise. 
To evaluate the impact on worked hours and on informality, we select the 
observation that fulfil the requirements to be in the program and that also have 
positive worked hours. In the case of the assessment of the rate of participation, 
we select the observations only with the first condition. Additionally, for the eva-
luation of the three outcome variables we only take into account people between 
22 and 55 years old, evaluating them separately by gender and region (Montevideo 
and rest of the urban country). We present the descriptive statistics of the sample 
selected in the Appendix (Tables B.3 and B.4).
Using the 2006 ECH, we find a negative and significant effect of the program 
on worked hours (mainly for women) only for the rest of the urban country (see Table 
10). For the rest of the urban country, men and women in an Ingreso Ciudadano 
receiving households work on average 2.5 and 6.4 hours less per week. 
TABLE 10
AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT ON TOTAL HOURS OF WORK














Montevideo Male 37.9 40.5 -2.6 * 40.2 -2.4
N = 435 N = 325 (1.4) N = 325 (1.5)
Female 26.1 26.9 -0.9 26.3 -0.2
N = 273 N = 243 (1.8) N = 243 (1.9)
Rest of the
urban country
Male 39.9 42.0 -2.1 * 42.4 -2.5 *
N = 827 N = 543 (1.0) N = 543 (1.0)
Female 23.2 28.9 -5.7 ** 29.5 -6.4 **
N = 483 N = 312 (1.4) N = 312 (1.7)
Source: Own estimations based on the ECH 2006.
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. Bootstrap standard error based on 1000 replications for the After 
Matching test, *,** statistically different from zero at 5% and 1% respectively.260 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Noviembre) 2009
In order to clearly appreciate the reduction in worked hours, we calculate it 
as a percentage of average worked hours for the corresponding region. We observe 
a decrease in the men´s labour supply of 5.1% and a decrease in the women´s 
labour supply of 17% in the test of the urban country. 
Table 11 shows that the matched controls serve as counterfactuals to the trea-
ted group. Our matching seems to have selected an appropriate control group.
TABLE 11
MATCHING TEST FOR THE IMPACT ON TOTAL HOURS OF WORK













Male CLI 0.21 0.18 0.03 *** 0.21 0.00
Social security 
transfers
0.85 0.74 0.11 *** 0.86 -0.01
Female CLI 0.20 0.17 0.03 *** 0.20 0.00
Social security 
transfers
0.89 0.78 0.11 *** 0.91 -0.02
Source: Own estimations based on the ECH 2006.
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. Bootstrap standard error based on 1000 replications for the After 
Matching test, *,** statistically different from zero at 5% and 1% respectively.
We do not find any impact of the Ingreso Ciudadano program on participation 
rate and informality6. As mentioned in the introduction the literature generally does 
not find significant impacts of the programs on labor supply. Our work suggests 
that the disincentives to work are relevant in the Uruguayan case. 
5.4  Robustness check
As a robustness check and given the fact than in Section 3 we show that 
the focalization of the program improved in the year 2007, we estimate the impact 
on school attendance and labor supply using the ECH 20077. Similar to the year 
2006 we find no effect on school attendance in 2007. The negative effect on labor 
supply in the rest of the urban country continues in 2007 (see Table 12). 
When we use the 2007 ECH two facts arise. On one hand, in 2007 the 
program is better targeted than in 2006 as we discuss above. For that reason, we 
observe fewer observations in the control group in relation with the treatment 
6  We do not report the coefficients here, but the estimates are available from the authors upon 
request. 
7  We can not estimate the impact in child labor because the ECH 2007 does not contain information 
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group. On the other hand, the sample size of the 2006 survey is much larger than 
the 2007 survey, so we have a smaller treatment and control group in 2007. Despite 
these two facts, we find negative effects on labour supply for the Rest of the Urban 
Country. Therefore, we can conclude that our results are robust. 
6.  Conclusions
This paper seeks to determine whether the participation in the Uruguayan 
conditional cash transfer Ingreso Ciudadano impacts on the school attendance, 
child labor and labor supply of household members. Such assessment is desirable 
in terms of the evaluation of the program. While there has been a considerable work 
about the impact of CCT programs in Latin America there is a limited amount of 
work that analyze the impact of the Uruguayan CCT program.
We show that the threshold to enter to the program has not been respected 
in the practice. This invalidates the use of regression discontinuity analysis. In this 
paper we use a propensity score matching procedure to assess the casual impact of 
the program. We find that the Ingreso Ciudadano program has no impact on school 
attendance, it reduces female child labor in Montevideo and it reduces total hours 
of work in the rest of the urban country. Our work suggests that the disincentives 
to work are relevant in the Uruguayan case.
TABLE 12
AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT. TOTAL HOURS OF WORK















Male 36.1 40.4 -4.3 ** 41.0 -5.1 **
N = 498 N = 197 (1.5) N = 197 (1.7)
Female 22.5 24.9 -2.4  25.4 -2.9
N = 335 N = 147 (1.9) N = 147 (2.2)
Source: Own estimations based on the ECH 2006.
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. Bootstrap standard error based on 1000 replications for the After 
Matching test, *,** statistically different from zero at 5% and 1% respectively.262 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Noviembre) 2009
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Montevideo 2,006 0.18 0.01 0.08 0.13 0.62
0.09 0.01 0.17 0.17 1.00
0.17 0.00 0.08 0.13 0.62
0.09 0.00 0.15 0.18 0.83
North  1,308 0.08 0.01 0.37 0.18 2.06
0.05 0.01 0.12 0.23 0.52
0.08 0.00 0.39 0.17 2.29
0.05 0.00 0.15 0.23 0.65
North center  2,101 0.07 0.00 -0.36 0.11 3.27
0.04 0.00 -0.12 0.16 0.75
0.08 0.00 -0.42 0.11 3.82
0.04 0.00 -0.1 0.16 0.63
South center 902 0.07 0.01 0.19 0.19 1.00
0.04 0.01 0.19 0.25 0.76
0.07 0.00 0.22 0.19 1.16
0.04 0.00 0.2 0.25 0.8
South  1,298 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.06
0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.27 0.11
0.07 0.00 0.01 0.18 0.06
0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.26 0.12
Source: Own estimations based on the ECH 2006.
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. Bootstrap standard error based on 1000 replications for the After 
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